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The remarkably consistent unifying theme of this conference has been this one: can
the methodology of modern analytical macroeconomics be used to address major ques-
tions about the goals and implementation of monetary policy? As Lawrence Christiano
pointed out in his comments earlier this morning, it is amazing how similar are the
tools, scientiﬁc methodology, and assumptions that each and every presenter has used.
When the Bank of Japan (BOJ) created its two Honorary Adviser positions decades
ago, the initial appointments were the warring prophets of Monetarism and Keynesian-
ism, Milton Friedman and James Tobin. But I think it is fair to say that the three current
and former Honorary Advisers present today—myself, Bennett T. McCallum, and John
B. Taylor—share a fairly common framework for thinking about standard macro is-
sues, even though Taylor and I happen to be in the line of descent from Tobin, whereas
McCallum is a descendant of Friedman. That macro framework, as the papers we have
discussed show, is increasingly eclectic and nondenominational. Its widespread accep-
tance testiﬁes to the signiﬁcant scientiﬁc progress that macroeconomists have made
over the last three decades.
In these remarks I will review this basic common framework, the fruitful ways in
which the conference papers employ it, and the papers’ relevance to some current global
policy problems. We should be uncomfortable, however, whenever we are tempted to
succumb to the notion that the outstanding issues in a ﬁeld as complex as monetary
policy conform to any sort of received wisdom. I will therefore also highlight some
obvious questions of ﬁrst-order importance that the conference papers addressed, if at
all, only obliquely. As I understand it, these further questions, connected with ﬁnancial
instability, will be the focus of the BOJ’s 2009 International Conference.
The class of models central to most of the conference papers grows out of a large lit-
erature on dynamic macroeconomic models with microfoundations, incorporating price
rigidities but also rational expectations in the manner pioneered by Phelps and Taylor
(1977) and Fischer (1977) three decades ago (and subject to the critique of Barro [1977]
that more recent models have been at pains to avoid). Marvin Goodfriend and Robert
King called this approach the “New Neoclassical Synthesis,” while Kenneth Rogoff and
I have applied a closely related approach under the name of the “New Open-Economy
Macroeconomics.” The most authoritative development and summary of the general
setup is in Michael Woodford’s (2003) treatise. These models avoid the Lucas (1976)
critique by incorporating rational expectations of policy rules, and the microeconomic
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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PREMISSION 49foundations allow an explicit welfare analysis of alternative regimes. As Andrew Levin
reminded us in his comments from the ﬂoor, however, the empirical basis for some
of the more common assumptions about demography and preferences (not to mention
expectations formation) is shaky, to say the least. Yet policy conclusions are likely
to be quite sensitive to just these assumptions. Now that we have become adept with
these models, the robustness of welfare conclusions is likely to be a major issue going
forward. The paper we heard George Evans present, which I will return to below, high-
lights the convergence properties of different learning processes and thus emphasizes
one aspect of the problem.
At some level, the current modeling approach starts with the work of Kydland and
Prescott (1982) on real business cycles. This was a heroic attempt to capture the salient
features of macro ﬂuctuations with a variant of the perfectly competitive Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans growth model, abstracting from money or economic rigidities and allowing
only for technology shocks. Earlier work on the business cycle had placed money at
center stage, but the bold Kydland-Prescott approach eliminated at a stroke a major
embarrassment in macroeconomics: we really do not fully understand money, where
to draw the line separating money from near-money assets, or the nature of money
demand. The most salient manifestation of intellectual convergence since the 1980s
has been the willingness of researchers, almost without regard to academic pedigree,
to entertain realistic distortions and institutional features relating to non-auction mar-
kets. Not coincidentally, the neo-Keynesian sticky-price approach shares an important
selling point with the real business cycle approach. Based on the realistic view that
the central bank’s monetary instrument is a short-term nominal interest rate, the neo-
Keynesian model of monetary policy eliminates the need to worry about explicit de-
scriptions of money supply and demand. Money is an accounting unit, the interest rate
set by the central bank is the intertemporal relative price of that unit, and the depen-
dence of the interest rate on price inﬂation through a variant of the Taylor rule ties
down the price level. Money supply and demand, whatever they may be, automatically
adjust in the background.
The neo-Keynesian modeling technology has led to a rigorous and deep analysis
of the inﬂation-targeting function of central banks. But this elegant and effective ham-
mer encourages us to think that every monetary policy problem is a nail. That is the
downside. Thus, the conference papers addressed only tangentially the biggest macro
policy problem before us today, a problem that is interacting adversely with the abil-
ity to hit inﬂation targets at reasonable output cost: ﬁnancial instability. In my review
of the papers presented over the last two days, I would like to expand on the ﬁnan-
cial instability theme and draw out some of the ways in which the subprime problem
that originated in the U.S. housing market is complicating the task of monetary policy
around the world.
More than most of the other contributions to this conference, Lawrence Christiano’s
paper (with Cosmin Ilut, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno)
1 has a direct bearing
on the genesis of the current crisis. I want to start there, because there has been an
ongoing debate about the response of monetary policy to asset bubbles that has been
1. Christiano et al. (2008).
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renewed in the past year. Christiano’s paper explicitly addresses that debate. According
to what one may call the Greenspan-Bernanke-Gertler doctrine, central banks should
not use monetary policy in attempts to pop positive asset-price bubbles; this is better
accomplished through regulatory means, whereas monetary policy may be appropri-
ate for cleaning up any post-bubble mess. An inﬂuential paper setting out this view
is Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
2 Their view is that, to the extent that bubbles arise
from ﬁnancial market imperfections, prudential policies—akin to the macroprudential
approaches being debated at the moment—are most likely to attack the underlying
economic distortions at their sources. Yet, two major asset price crashes later, it re-
mains unclear that monetary policy can generally be conducted independently of the
need to worry about the ﬁnancial system—a point also realized during Japan’s recent
deﬂationary experience.
Christiano’s paper gives an example of what can happen when an inﬂation-targeting
central bank underestimates the level of the natural real rate of interest, lowering the
nominal rate to offset the deﬂation generated by the unobserved economic change. The
result can look like a boom cycle, followed by a crash if the anticipated event moti-
vating the rise in the natural real interest rate (such as a future technology improve-
ment) does not actually occur. Of course, this boom-crash sequence entails monetary
instability. Christiano then looks at the idea of a two-pillar strategy. The European
Central Bank (at least ofﬁcially) employs a two-pillar strategy based on inﬂation and
the broad money stock. Christiano looks at one based on monitoring both the volume
of credit and inﬂation. Another possibility that arises out of this work is to target wage
inﬂation, which Christiano shows to have some advantages. Potentially, this work is
complementary to some older literature on the predictive content of credit aggregates
(for example, Friedman and Kuttner [1993]), but many policymakers remain skeptical
about placing weight on volatile nominal aggregates. Thus, Lars Heikensten, the former
governor of the Swedish Riksbank, has described Sweden’s policy of taking asset
price movements into account but explicitly rejects the suggestion of putting credit (or
money) growth into the policy rule.
3
A second and very relevant topic we have looked at is the problem of anchoring
inﬂation expectations. The link between macro outcomes and longer-term expectations
is especially critical right now given the growing inﬂationary pressures in the world
economy. George Evans’ paper with Seppo Honkapohja
4 focused on this connection, as
did, implicitly, Lawrence Christiano’s. Evans considered an operational monetary pol-
icy rule with discounted least-squares learning. In that setting, he found, expectations
do not converge. Particularly in a setup where the central bank might have to change
its policy rule, for example, due to a change in the natural real rate of interest, policy-
makers are in a bind. How can policy anchor expectations in such an environment? How
2. Alan Greenspan recently reasserted his view; see Krishna Guha, “Greenspan Urges Policymakers to Focus on
Banks’ Capitalisation,” Financial Times, May 27, 2008. Interestingly, in his comments from the ﬂoor on the
original presentation by Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Greenspan allowed that if asset prices rose to form a
bubble as abruptly as they crashed, monetary policy might be well advised to react in some instances. But this,
he claimed, is not normally the case. His summary: “The markets are asymmetric; we [central bankers] are not.”
3. Lars Heikensten, “More to It than ‘Leaning against the Wind,’” Financial Times, May 28, 2008.
4. Evans and Honkapohja (2008).
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in the policy rule? Do we explain to the public that the natural real rate of interest
has changed? How do we demonstrate that it has changed? It is a difﬁcult problem.
Christopher Sims’ analysis
5 also leads us to think about the anchoring of expectations.
If ﬁscal policy is in the picture, so that the government’s intertemporal budget con-
straint must be respected, certain central bank announcements may lack credibility if
ﬁscal policy is given, and therefore fail to move market expectations. What options does
the central bank have then?
Michael Woodford’s paper with Vasco Cúrdia
6 touches directly on ﬁnancial market
imperfections, elegantly incorporating into the basic monetary model an interest rate
borrowing spread. Much of our discussion focused on the relevance of this extension
to current credit market woes, and whether, as Cúrdia and Woodford essentially as-
sumed, one can typically separate monetary policy from ﬁnancial policy. Part of the
unease is that there are asymmetries (as Greenspan notes in the quotation I reproduced
earlier) between periods in which asset price misalignments are generated and those in
which prices crash. These movements, and their effects, are not well captured by a log-
linearizable model. The discrepancyarisesinpart becauseof the rateof price movement
in the down phase, in part because certain markets may seize up entirely, furnishing a
ﬁrst-order transmission mechanism from asset-price declines to the broader economy.
In his still pertinent comment on the paper on asset prices by Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), Dornbusch (1999, p. 133) summarized his skepticism by noting that the
Bernanke-Gertler model “is just price based and lacks rationing and liquidity,” whereas
intheaftermathofamajorassetpricecollapse,“marketsplainstopintermsofﬂowsand
rollovers,” possibly leading to “pervasive default.”
7 In that context, Governor Shirakawa
made a very apt comment in his opening remarks.
8 He said “although the monetary
policy in a conventional sense and ﬁnancial system policy are usually considered as
different policyprescriptions,theybecomerelatedinacomplicatedanddelicatemanner
in critical phases.” We are certainly now, as everyone would agree, in a critical phase.
In Christiano’s model, the key question is to ascertain the prevailing natural real
rate of interest. That challenge is sidestepped by the commonly used simple formu-
lations of the Taylor rule. Another problem in applying Taylor rules, one that Mark
Gertler mentioned earlier today, is the distinction between core and headline inﬂation.
The model in Gertler’s paper with Luca Sala and Antonella Trigari
9 might lend itself
to an analysis of the question, as it focuses on the details of labor market equilibrium
and considers wage indexation. (Of course, a focus on nominal wage targeting, as sug-
gested by Christiano, would make the issue moot.) When will the persistent exchange
depreciation and oil price increases faced by the United States begin to feed into wages?
Other countries face similar pressures. I am not convinced that in a supply-shocked en-
vironment like the present one, the prescription to simply strip volatile components out
5. Sims (2008).
6. Cúrdia and Woodford (2008).
7. In the subsequent discussion, Dornbusch (1999) remarks more pointedly: “When I talked about liquidity, I did
not talk about spreads. I talked about markets ceasing to exist. That is not your model.”
8. Shirakawa (2008).
9. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008).
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of consumer price index (CPI) inﬂation makes for effective expectations anchoring or
inﬂation control.
For many countries, the pressing issue right now is the response to imported in-
ﬂation. The Mayekawa Lecture by John B. Taylor
10 emphasized this problem within a
global perspective. The inﬂationary pressures in the world economy today are greatly
accentuated by the relative success of the emerging markets—markets such as China,
India, and Brazil. The paper by Ippei Fujiwara, Keisuke Otsu, and Masashi Saito
11
was ﬁrmly focused on Chinese growth, although the authors did not emphasize the
monetary implications of China’s growth or of the growth of emerging markets more
generally. In large part, the recent upsurge in inﬂation is the result of a reluctance to
let currencies appreciate. China’s current predicament is only one of many instances. In
many cases there has been some depreciation against the U.S. dollar, but generally
less depreciation than the euro has experienced. The problem, indeed, is similar to
the one embedded in Christiano’s paper. These economies have a “natural” real ex-
change rate that the monetary authorities resist in the interest of export promotion and
growth. They keep the nominal interest rate relatively low to discourage appreciation,
so the equilibrium real exchange rate must approach its natural level gradually through
domestic inﬂation. Appreciation has been restrained in some emerging economies,
not only through monetary policy but also through the imposition of capital inﬂow
taxes of various kinds. Colombia, Thailand, and other countries have taken this route
in recent years.
How bad is the emerging inﬂation problem? Taylor presented some data in his
lecture, but let me reinforce his presentation with some additional numbers taken from
the most recent issue of the Economist. These numbers cover the most recent known
monthly inﬂation rates. Among other examples, we ﬁnd Chile, 8.3 percent; Venezuela,
29.3 percent; Egypt, 16.4 percent; Turkey, 9.7 percent; Russia, 13.3 percent; Saudi
Arabia, 9.6 percent; the Czech Republic, 6.8 percent; South Africa, 10.6 percent; India,
7.9 percent; and China, 8.5 percent. There is a gathering inﬂationary threat in every
region of the world. Not all countries have such high inﬂation rates; I have tried to pick
particularly striking examples. Clearly, however, something is going on. Clearly, these
countries should allow their currencies to rise further against the dollar. The obstacles
to doing so impede the reduction of another problematic phenomenon mentioned in
Taylor’s remarks, global imbalances.
It is no accident that the exchange rate changes that would allow many countries to
avoid inﬂation are also those that would help reduce global imbalances most rapidly.
Sims’ paper put me in mind of the fact that not only do governments have intertemporal
constraints, so do entire countries. If we consider the matter within a framework like
that of Sims, we might ask how the adjustments that force countries to live within their
intertemporal constraints occur in practice. In Sims-type models of the ﬁscal theory
of the price level, debt deﬂation or inﬂation may be the mechanism enforcing public
solvency over time. In an international context, similar adjustments based on exchange
rate and other asset price movements often are at work.
10. Taylor (2008).
11. Fujiwara, Otsu, and Saito (2008).
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out most of the 2000s. These are historically high deﬁcits, yet if you look at the net
foreign asset position of the United States in the last few years, it has barely budged.
Why? The answer comes from considering the composition of the country’s gross for-
eign assets and liabilities. The United States holds gross foreign assets exceeding its
GDP. It holds an even higher value of gross foreign liabilities. Most U.S. liabilities
are dollar-denominated, although the percentage is understandably coming down. A
good portion of U.S. foreign assets, however, is denominated in foreign currencies. As
a result, when the dollar depreciates unexpectedly, there is a large wealth transfer to
the United States—foreigners lose on their dollar claims, whereas U.S. residents gain
on their foreign-currency foreign claims. For dollar depreciations of the sizes we have
seen recently, these transfers can amount to several percentage points of GDP. These
are very big numbers.
Sims presented some preliminary vector autoregressions showing the predictive
power of primary government surpluses for inﬂation. Some very interesting work pub-
lished last year by Gourinchas and Rey (2007) shows, analogously, that net export
deﬁcits by the United States tend to predict higher rates of return on U.S. foreign as-
sets, and lower rates of return on U.S. foreign liabilities. The result is a reduction in
the U.S. net debt to foreigners, which helps to maintain intertemporal solvency. Much
of the international wealth redistribution is effected through exchange rate movements
that are not offset in advance by nominal interest differentials.
How long can this type of adjustment process continue? We need to know in order
to understand where the United States and the world economy are headed. Clearly, the
link between deﬁcits and depreciation that Gourinchas and Rey detect in the data is
not a menu for U.S. policy choice. Eventually, foreign investors will refuse to accept
these low relative returns on U.S. assets. There is clearly a payoff to eliminating global
imbalances by managing monetary policies in a more cooperative manner. It remains
to be seen how the inevitable external adjustments in the international economy will
come about.
Another reason some emerging markets are reluctant to adjust their exchange rates
downward—that is, to allow their currencies to appreciate—is that they are holding
large stocks of foreign exchange reserves. Those reserves will lose value if the domestic
currencies rise, with negative implications for central bank capital positions and/or the
public ﬁnances. There is much talk of ofﬁcial diversiﬁcation out of dollars, and indeed
some has occurred, but the implied coordination problem among dollar reserve holders
is a factor hanging over foreign exchange markets. A similar instability characterized
markets starting in the 1960s as a result of large acquisitions of dollars by foreign
central banks.
In 1968, when industrial countries agreed to sever the market link between the
dollar and the price of gold, the world economy found itself on a pure ﬁat currency
standard. It took several decades for economists and central bankers to grasp at an
intellectual level the technology of inﬂation control in a setting of sophisticated
ﬁnancial markets and ﬁat currencies. Just as we thought we had arrived at reliable
answers, however, we realized that understanding the inﬂation process is not enough—
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the deregulated ﬁnancial markets themselves are central to monetary transmission, and
can be a potent independent source of disturbance. This would not have surprised Henry
Thornton, who in 1802 wrote what is probably the ﬁrst modern treatment of central
bank policy under a ﬁat standard. His classic treatise was called An Enquiry into the
Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (see Thornton [1939]). For
Thornton, who wrote shortly after the start of Britain’s 1797–1821 suspension of the
gold standard, private credit and public credit—the value of government debt includ-
ing money—were inextricably linked. Thus, Thornton focused his policy discussion as
much on ﬁnancial stability (and on the Bank of England as a last-resort lender) as on
the determination of the price level; and in his account, the two sets of questions are
inherently bound together. Recent events remind us how much we need to return to
this historical perspective.
I am out of time. This conference has demonstrated the great progress that has been
made in understanding monetary policy. But our discussions have also brought out how
much we still can learn. We all thank the BOJ for providing a venue in which abstract
monetary theory and practical policy questions can comfortably be discussed in full
depth and side by side.
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